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I. INTRODUCTION
There is no universally recognized standard for determining whether
a statement is defamatory. What is defamatory in one society in light
of its cultural heritage, moral convictions and social norms is not
necessarily defamatory in another society. Thus, a statement alleging
a person to be an informer is regarded as defamatory in some legal
systems, while most others prefer to deny defamation actions based
upon such statements. The wisdom of the latter practice will be
explored in this article through the anatomy of a 1985 decision of
the Israeli Supreme Court.
The case, Shaha v. Dardiryan,' referred to a political reality in
which informers are exposed to mortal danger. Indeed, a great deal
of the blood shed in the recent uprising in the territories occupied
by Israel since the Six Day War belonged to local Palestinians mur-
dered by militant organizations for suspicion of collaboration 2 with
the Israeli authorities.' These murders cast a new light on Shaha,
which examined from the perspective of defamation law the legal
ramifications of a statement accusing a member of the local com-
munity of collaboration with the Israeli authorities. The case served
* L.L.B, L.L.M. (Heb. U. of Jerusalem), J.S.D. (Yale), Senior lecturer, law
faculty, Tel-Aviv University. The author expresses his gratitude to professors Y.
Dinstein, M. Dan-Cohen, A. Shapira and A. Soifer and to advocates S. Thoosia-
Cohen and N. Floom for their most helpful suggestions.
1. c.a. 466/83, Shaha v. Dardiryan, P.D. 39 (4) 734 (1985) [hereinafter Shaha].
2. This term denoting a criminal offense often has been employed to describe
rendering assistance to the enemy to forward its goals. See cri.a. 232/55, Attorney
General v. Grinvald, P.D. 12 2017, 2284 (1958). The Hebrew word for collaboration,
"-shithoof peoula" also means "cooperation." It is not clear whether the Shaha
court refers to "collaboration" or to "cooperation" when using this word. The
facts seem to indicate that the reference is to "collaboration."
3. This phenomenon is not new, yet in the last months it has intensified
tremendously. The lucky ones among those persecuted have been merely harassed
or beaten by other Palestinians. See E. YAMU AND Z. SmEF, THE IN=AIFIAH at 268
(in Hebrew 1990).
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as a vehicle for setting a standard for determining whether a statement
is defamatory. It gave the Israeli Supreme Court ample opportunity
to evaluate the role of public policy in judicial decision-making in
general, and in adjudicating defamation cases in particular. The theme
of Shaha resonates with similar problems encountered by other legal
systems faced with corresponding political predicaments.
The uniqueness of the Israeli situation, however, should not be
missed. The Court probed the question of the defamatory nature of
the term "informer" in the particularly explosive situation in which
the cultures in issue conflict. Moreover, the uniqueness of this case
is illuminating for an additional reason. The fact that, in this case,
the dominant political group of a state was called to pass judgment
on what constituted defamation only from an adversary's viewpoint
sharpens the present dilemma in a less polarized fashion than in other
political and legal situations. In addition to analyzing the Israeli
Supreme Court responses to that dilemma in light of other reactions
in the Anglo-American legal world, this article suggests alternative
avenues the Shaha plaintiff might have tried.
A. The Shaha Case-Facts and Issues
The plaintiff, an Archbishop in the Armenian Church in East
Jerusalem, and the defendant, the Patriarch of that church, were
both citizens of the Kingdom of Jordan. They have lived and operated,
for many years, within the Arab community of East Jerusalem and
have had strong ties with the Arab world. Apparently no love was
lost between these two spiritual leaders. Rather than solve their dif-
ferences within their holy community, they crossed swords in the
open, involving the Jordanian press and the Israeli courts in the duel.
In a statement made to the Jordanian Government, the defendant
accused Archbishop Shaha of collaboration with the Israeli Govern-
ment in supporting Israeli policy and actions in the occupied terri-
tories. The defendant also was responsible for another statement which
was published in a Jordanian newspaper and distributed in East
Jerusalem, Judea, and Samaria. The statement claimed that the plain-
tiff, whose picture was displayed in the Hebrew newspaper, had
boasted in an interview to a Hebrew newspaper published in West
Jerusalem that "He enjoys an Israeli protection and that it is not
necessary to mention the rest of the details." This statement, which
was republished in other Jordanian newspapers, was tantamount to
stating that the plaintiff was "an informer" who had collaborated
with the Israeli authorities. After the publication of these statements,
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Jordanian authorities decided to deny the plaintiff entry into the
Kingdom of Jordan.
In an action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant in the
District Court of Jerusalem, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant's
statements were false and defamatory, that their publication had
lowered him in the estimation of many Arabs, especially those who
live in East Jerusalem and other territories occupied by Israel, and
that the result was to expose him to the Arabs' hatred. The plaintiff
also claimed that these publications injured him in his vocation, which
necessitated frequent visits to the Arab states, causing him pecuniary
damage since he was unable to enter into the Kingdom of Jordan
to exploit or enjoy the Jordanian real estate he owned.
The District Court of Jerusalem decided to accept the defendant's
motion to strike the claim for lack of cause of action. 4 It stated that
the decision whether a statement is defamatory depends upon norms
prevailing in the community (in this case Israel) whose courts are
called upon to make that decision.
The District Court explained that the opinions of those who oppose
these norms and even deny the right of that community to exist are
to be discarded. To win a defamation case, a plaintiff is required to
establish the defamatory nature of the statement in question. He
must do more than prove that as a result of the statement's publication
his reputation is likely to be lowered in the eyes of the members of
the particular social group to which he belongs. He also must show
that the norms and opinions of that particular group are not rejected
by society generally.' In this case he failed to do so.
Plaintiff's appeal 6 was unanimously dismissed by the Israeli Su-
preme Court. The Court addressed itself to two legal questions:
4. Under Israeli law, the test for striking a claim for lack of cause of action
is whether or not the facts described in the claim sheet, assuming they are true,
establish a valid cause of action. Courts act cautiously in such matters and usually
enable the plaintiff to rewrite his claim in order to save it from being struck down.
See, e.g., c.a. 693/83, Shemesh v. Land Registrar, P.D. 40(2) 668, 671 (1986); c.a.
280/84 Ofri v. State of Israel, P.D. 40(3) 358, 359 (1986).
5. It is clearly so in the case of a group of criminals who disapprove of any
member who collaborates with the law enforcement authorities. The District Court
gave an example: Suppose a Nazi argued before an English court that a false statement
alleging that he had saved Jews from the crematories during the Second World War
lowered him in the estimation of his Nazi friends. Is it conceivable that such an
action would be allowed?
6. In his appeal, the plaintiff offered an example of his own to prove that the
"majority vote" rule is wrong: Assume that during the British Mandate in Palestine
1989]
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(1) What is the right standard for determining the existence or
nonexistence of defamatory content in a statement? Is it the standard
of the "right-thinking members of society generally" or may there
be another standard?; and
(2) What is the role of public policy in defamation cases? Should
the courts allow defamation actions for statements that contain
allegations which, although commendable by most people, are re-
garded by certain community segments as defamatory for illegal or
anti-social reasons?
The Court also wrestled with the issue of whether readiness on the
part of the judiciary to adjudicate such claims might be tantamount
to officially recognizing the legitimacy of anti-social views or whether
it might be perceived as such by the public. In addition, the Court
confronted the question of whether the social interest in avoiding
such an interpretation outweighs the public interest in protecting each
member in the community from defamation.
B. The Shaha Case - The Supreme Court Decision
The three judges in Shaha clearly disagreed as to the right test for
determining whether a statement is defamatory. Levin, J., followed
the standard of the "right-thinking members of society generally"
and concluded that its application in that case justified the District
Court decision to strike the claim for lack of a cause of action. He
argued:
Every reasonable person in Israel as well as in any civilized state
does not regard as defamatory a statement alleging that a certain
person collaborated with a policy aiming at securing the Rule of
Law and maintaining security and public order. On the contrary,
a person acting this way will be regarded by any reasonable person
as someone who deserves to be commended and encouraged.
7
Elon, J., rejected the right-thinking man's test in favor of the fol-
lowing test: "Is the statement likely to injure a person . . . within
the segment of the community to which he belongs, according to the
common norms prevailing in that group?" A statement is defamatory
it was alleged that a Jew informed the British authorities of the hiding places of
several Jewish freedom fighters. It is reasonable to assume that such a statement
would have been deemed defamatory despite the fact that most members of the
Arab community in Palestine, which constituted the majority of the population then,
probably would not have regarded it as such.
7. Shaha, at 741.
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even when the number of members in that segment of the community
is small and even if that statement is not regarded as offensive by
the majority of the public. Furthermore, the statement is defamatory
even if the "right-thinking" person views the norms of that segment
of the community as peculiar.8 Thus, if the plaintiff is a member of
a small group that regards watching television as a sin and avoids
any member who commits such a sin by boycotting his business, a
false statement alleging that the plaintiff secretly watches television
would be defamatory.
Ben-Porath, D.P., also decided to forego the test of the "right-
thinking members of society generally" in favor of a more flexible
test. In principle, she expressed readiness to extend protection to any
person injured as a result of a false statement, including a statement
that was defamatory only according to the social norms and beliefs
of the community segment within which the statement's target lived.
Courts, however, should act cautiously in such cases; otherwise, they
are likely to find themselves occasionally compelled to change the
legal criteria for determining whether a statement is defamatory. Such
ad hoc decision-making might prevent uniformity and introduce un-
certainty into this branch of the law. 9
The decision to find for the defendant in Shaha was justified by
public policy considerations. Levin, J., took a firm stand on this
matter, stating:
As a matter of judicial policy, it is impossible and inconceivable
that an Israeli court will determine that a collaboration with the
government of Israel and its policy is an activity that should be
regarded, under certain circumstances, as defaming the collaborator.
The policy and activities of the government of Israel in Judea and
Samaria aim at maintaining law and order, attaining respect for the
law, and achieving as far as possible a secure and normal life there.
A person who collaborates with the government of Israel for the
realization of these goals or enjoys its protection for that reason
will not be regarded as doing something wrong just because his
activities are regarded disfavorably by the enemies of the State who
disagree with its policy in the occupied territories and with its right
to rule and operate there10 . .. Some matters ... are supreme and
8. Id. at 750.
9. Id. at 747.
10. Some Israelies, including Knesset members, hold this view. Does that make
them enemies of the state of Israel? One may also question whether it was necessary
to deal at all with this political question.
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overshadow all niceties of .. . the usual legal rules .... Judicial
policy may demand denying accessibility to court in certain unworthy
matters. Such a policy is indeed irregular and should be pursued
carefully yet vigorously in the appropriate exceptional circumstances
such as those existing in this case."
The views of Ben-Porath, D.P., and Elon, J., on this matter were
more equivocal. Ben-Porath asserted that a decision that a statement
is defamatory should not be confused with a decision about the
desirability of the ideas conveyed in that statement. Allowing a mem-
ber of a minority group to bring a defamation action for allegations
that are offensive merely according to that group's norms, and even
giving a judgment in his favor, are not tantamount to an endorsement
by the Court of the values and principles of that minority group.
Ben-Porath pronounced herself ready, on principle, to adjudge and,
in an appropriate case, render judgment in favor of a plaintiff "ac-
cused" of conduct desirable from the point of view of society gen-
erally. Moreover, she acknowledged that under exceptional
circumstances, a court could regard as defamatory a false statement
alleging that an Israeli resident, who was a citizen of both Israel and
a friendly foreign state, collaborated with the Israeli authorities to
the detriment of the interests of that foreign state. Ben-Porath denies,
however, that there may be such a cause of action for a plaintiff
who is a citizen of a state hostile to Israel, because "[I]t should not
be expected of the Israeli judiciary to regard as 'defamatory' a
communication (even a false one) according to which an Israeli res-
ident (such as the plaintiff) acts against the interests of the enemies
of the State, the fact that such an activity constitutes a breach of
trust toward that hostile State notwithstanding .. . . [P]rotection
11. Levin, J., in Shaha at 739. He added the following example: Assume that
it is said about a person that he is a friend of the Jews or protects Zionists. Such
statements can be regarded by those factions of the population in Judea and Samaria
and the Arab states, who are enemies of the state of Israel, as referring to conduct
or acts which cause hatred, deserve condemnation, and demand the outcast of those
"infected" by such conduct. It is unthinkable that an Israeli court will regard such
expressions as defamatory against one proved to be actually a friend of the Jews.
Compare with the spirit of decisions such as h.c. 253/64, Geris v. The Head of
Haifa District, P.D. 18(4) 673 (1964) (Every state has an elementary right to preserve
its liberty and its existence); h.c. 1/65, Yardor v. Chairman of the Central Election
Committee to the Sixth Knesset, P.D. 19(3) 365, 390 (1965) (per Zussman, J., "A
state is not bound to be destroyed. Its judges are not allowed to sit idle and when
facing a lack of a positive law when encounter a petitioner who asks them to help
him put an end to the state." But see e.a. 2,3/85, Nieman and Others v. The Central
Election Committee to the Eleventh Knesset, P.D. 39(2) 225 (1985).
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given by the Defamation Prohibition Law is not that of an umbrella
sheltering every victim of false communications." 12
Elon, J., seemed to agree with the stand taken by Ben-Porath
regarding the role of judicial policy in this matter. Yet he also
examined a broader question: Is it appropriate for the court to open
its gates to an action consisting of illegal factual components? He
concluded that, in principle, courts should strive to do justice between
the parties before them, even though the judges may have to "dirty"
their hands in so doing. In defamation cases, justice means enabling
the victim to sue the author of the defamatory statement, even though
the very decision to allow the action might be erroneously interpreted
as an endorsement by the Court of an undesirable opinion. The whole
matter, however, is discretionary.
The Court should take into consideration factors such as the con-
duct of the parties and the gravity of the allegation made. There
should be a balancing of the interest in protecting the right to live
free of defamation against the interest not to legitimize wrong con-
ceptions or deeds (especially ones which undermine the rule of law)
in each case. Referring to the present case, Elon concluded:
It is true that a view exists within the appellant's circle, according
to which collaboration with the Israeli authorities in maintaining
law and order in Judea and Samaria is wrong and smells of 'in-
forming.' Yet such a view is so grave and unacceptable in terms of
the legal basis of Israel as a state governed by the rule of law and
in terms of safeguarding Israel's security and so irreconcilable with
basic notions of law and order, that its rejection should be given
priority over the goal of protecting the appellant's right not to be
regarded in disfavor by those members of his group who hold such
a false view. 3
Before probing the perplexing questions with which the Shaha Court
was confronted and evaluating the various solutions suggested in this
case, this article will survey responses to similar questions by courts
and commentators in the Anglo-American legal systems.
C. The Standard For Determining Whether A Statement Is
Defamatory
Under English law, a statement is defamatory if it is likely to be
perceived as such 4 by the "right-thinking members of society, gen-
12. Shaha, P.D. 39(4) at 747.
13. Id. at 754.
14. The inquiry focuses not upon the intent of the author or the publisher of
1989l
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erally."' 5 This standard, which can be traced to Roman law, 16 has
been adopted in Ireland,17 South Africa, 8 Israel 19 and in the past,
the United States. 20 It is an extremely ambiguous standard. Although
it appears to relate to the world of objective or factual reality, this
test does not refer to an actual group of people2' but, in fact, serves
to mask a subjective, normative evaluation.
Sometimes it is said that this standard refers to the community in
general. 22 Such a statement should not be taken at face value. Instead,
it is a figure of speech which expresses the view that the defamatory
nature of a statement ought to be determined according to the dom-
inant norms in a given society. It is unfortunate, however, that the
notion of the "community in general" is employed here. By definition,
this notion embraces all members of the community, including the
"wrong-thinking" ones. Obviously, the community is not governed
by a single normative standard. No single community sentiment pre-
vails with respect to any particular matter.23
the statement but rather upon its actual or potential impact upon its recipients. See
Dalaige, J., in Berry v. Irish Times Ltd. [1973] I.R. 368, 374.
15. It was first adopted in Parmiter v. Coupland and Another 151 E.R. 340,
342 (1840). See GATELY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER § 41 (8th ed. 1981) (quoting Tolley
v. Fry, (1930)) 1 K.B. 467, 479. See also Lord Etkin in Sim v. Stretch 2 All. E.R.
1237, 1240 (1936). DUNCAN AND NEILL ON DEFAMATION § 7.05 (1983); W.V.H.
ROoERS, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT 274, 275 (lth ed. 1979); A. DAVILA,
LIBEL LAW AND TH PREss 21 (1971).
16. See C.F. AMERASINOHE DEFAMATION AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE ACTIO
INEURIARUM IN RoMAN DUTCH LAW (IN CEYLON & SouTH AFRICA) 22 (1968). The
criterion there is the arbitrium boni: the view which would be taken by the ordinary
good and worthy subject of the King, the decent sensible persons, or "right-thinking
people generally."
17. See, e.g., Quigley v. Creation Ltd. [1971] I.R. 269 (per Walsh, J.)
18. See, e.g., Conroy v. Stewart Printing Co. Ltd., A.D.1015,1018 (1946).
19. See c.a. 68/56 Rabinowicz v. Merlin, P.D. 11 1224, 1226 (1957); c.a. 534/
65, Diab v. Diab, P.D. 20(2) 269, 274 (1966); c.c. (T.A.) 144/55, Yadin v. C.D.,
22 P.M. 352 (1968).
20. See Kinnerle v. New York Evening Journal, 262 N.Y. 99, 102, 186 N.E.
217, 218 (1930).
21. Hence, the test asks not who are these members of society?, what is required
to be eligible to be a member of this group?, is the composition of this group
changed with the nature of the matter at hand? Obviously, there are no clearly-
defined groups officially or unofficially recognized as comprising the "right-thinking
members of society generally."
22. See, e.g., Musacchio v. Maida, 137 N.Y.S.2d 131, 133 (1954); Burns v.
Supermarkets General Corp., 615 F. Supp. 154 (D. Pa. 1985); Harris v. School
Annual Pub. Co., 466 So. 2d 963 (Ala. 1985); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS sec. 559
(1938).
23. See Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment
11, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 1282, 1301 (1942).
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Indeed, "[tihat which is defamatory in the eyes of one segment
of the population may be laudatory in the eyes of another and a
matter of complete indifference to a third. '"24 Most communities are
not homogeneous. 25 They consist of many diversified sections, whose
thinking upon a given subject differs, yet all may be described fairly
as "right-thinking."
The designation of one or more sections as "right-thinking" is
problematic and undesirable, given the legitimate and often violent
differences of opinion in society. 26 Assume, for example, a statement
which claims that a certain medical doctor performs abortions free
of charge. Undoubtedly, this statement would lower this person in
the eyes of the "pro-life" groups. At the same time, however, it
might raise him in the esteem of various liberal organizations. 27 Is
the statement defamatory? Courts should avoid describing one of
these groups as representing the "right-thinking members of society"
in order to escape unnecessarily and unwisely determining which views
are "better."
Sometimes the "right-thinking members of society" are equated
with the "reasonable men." Some of the expressions used are: "read-
ers of reasonable ,understanding, discretion and candor ' 2 or "rea-
sonable and fair minded men." ' 29 The utility of this standard in
24. Note, The Community Segment in Defamation Actions: A Dissenting Essay,
58 YALE L. J. 1387 (1949) [hereinafter Note, The Community Segment]. See also
Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 182, 146 So. 234, 236 (1933) ("judicial decisions
[are] apt to vary with the social and moral views of the different jurisdictions").
25. Professor Post wrote recently, in another context:
Assimilationist law places the force of the state behind the cultural per-
spective of a particular, dominant group. If a society is relatively homo-
geneous, so that the values of this group are representatives of the society
as a whole, assimilationist law can be said to be expressive of common
community conventions or norms. But if the society is heterogeneous,
assimilationist law can instead be understood as an attempt, which may be
more or less hegemonic in character, to extend the conventions of a dominant
group to the larger society.
Post, Blasphemy, The First Amendment and the Concept of Intrinsic Harm, 8 TEL
Avrv U. STUD.N LAW 293, 295-96 (1988).
26. L.H. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, § 7, at 34. See also Duport
Steels Ltd. v. Sirs, [1980] 1 All E.R. 529, 550 (Q.B. 1980) (per Lord Keith of
Kinkel); h.c. 72/62 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior, P.D. 23(2) 477, 521-22 (1969).
27. See, e.g., Hepburn v. TCN, [1983] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 682, 693 (C.A.).
28. King v. Pillsbury, 115 Me. 528, 531, 99 513, 514 (1917); see also, Pitt,
Report of the Committee on Defamation, 39 MOD. L. REv. 187 (1976) ("reasonable
people generally").
29. Sack v. New York Times Co. 56 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 270
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determining the defamatory nature of a statement is questionable.
Aside from the fact that reasonable men may differ in their opinions
and may react differently to the same information, the very notion
of the "reasonable man" is hardly less ambiguous than that of the
"right-thinking members of society." The "reasonable man" is merely
a conception, an abstraction which obscures the role of the deci-
sionmaker as a policymaker. Some writers attribute to this mythical
figure features of the "ideal" man,30 thereby setting too high a
standard31 which departs from the "bonus pater familias. ' 3 2 Others
equate him with the "average person'' 33 or the "average prudent
person." 3 4 Similarly, the "right-thinking member of society" has been
equated with the citizen "of fair average intelligence." 35 The reference
is to the "right-thinking" person "of average education and normal
intelligence," to a "person who is not of morbid or suspicious mind,
nor is he supercritical or abnormally sensitive." ' 36 The emphasis is
usually on normalcy; the eccentric or wrong-thinking segments may
be considerable, but they are to be disregarded. The inquiry focuses
on the effect upon the common rather than the rational. 37 While
rationality is, or should be, a characteristic of the "reasonable man,"
A. D. 401, 59 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1946); Lewis v. Daily Telegraph (1964) App. Cas.
234, 259; cri.a. 279/63, Blan v. Novogrodetzky, P.D. 18(2) (1964) 427, 431; J.
DEAN, HATRED RIDICULE OR CONTEMPT 12 (1954).
30. See A.P. HERBERT UNCOMMON LAW 1-6 (1985). See generally Maccormick,
On Reasonableness in LES NOTIONS A COMTENN VARIABLE EN Dgorr 131, 136 (1984).
31. See LINDEN, CANADIAN NEGLIGENCE LAW 20 (1972).
32. See S. Jargensen, Liability And Fault, 49 TuL. L. REv. 329, 333-35 (1975).
33. Even when claiming to adopt this standard, the courts do not conduct
empirical research as to the hypothetical conduct of the average person in similar
circumstances despite the fact that the practice of mankind generally, and particularly
in the professional liability field, carries significant weight in determining reasona-
bleness. See Linden, Custom in Negligence, 11 CAN B. J. 151, 169 (1968); P.S.
ATYAH, ACCIDENTS COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 41 (3rd ed. 1980).
34. The emphasis here is not on the average conduct, but on the average prudence.
35. See Slatyer v. Daily Telegraph, 6 C.L.R. 1, 7 (Austl. 1908). See also DAVILA,
supra note 15, at 21, which mentions the criterion of "the citizen of fair intelligence."
Another expression is: "ordinary decent folk in the community, taken in general."
Gardiner v. John Fairfax & Sons, Ltd., 42 N.S.W. St.R. 171, 172 (1942). See also
Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Hurlbut, 696 S.W.2d 83, 96 (1985).
36. J.M. Burchell, The Criteria of Defamation, 91 S. AFR. L. J. 178, 179 (1974).
37. Devlin, L.J. in Rubber Improvements Ltd. v. Daily Telegraph Ltd. [1964]
App. Cas. 234, 285. In his book THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 15 (1965), Lord
Devlin wrote: "He is not to be confused with the rational man. He is not expected
to reason about anything and his judgement [sic] may be largely a matter of feeling.
It is the viewpoint of the man in the street... He might also be called the right-
minded man."
[Vol. 19:503
INFORMERS DEFAMATION
it does not necessarily characterize everything the average man does
or thinks. It is rather strange, however, to describe an irrational
reaction in terms of the reaction of the "right-thinking members of
society."
The real question in the search for a viable standard for determining
whether a statement is defamatory is not whether courts should
evaluate the nature of the alleged defamatory statement according to
the views held by the "reasonable person" or the "average citizen"
or by a conceptual entity which is an hybrid of those two notions;38
rather, it is whether they should follow actual community norms or
apply their own value judgments. 39 What should a judge do when
he believes that the actual or expected public reaction to a publication
is likely to be irrational, undesirable, or immoral? 4° Should he give
the standard of the "right-thinking members of society generally" a
normative meaning and find for the defendant, leaving remediless a
plaintiff who has in fact been harmed; or should he, instead, base
his decision upon actual community norms and decide for the plain-
tiff?
41
This gap between the way people ought to react to certain com-
munication and the way they actually do react seems inevitable. There
is no reason whatsoever, for instance, to think less of a woman who
was raped, yet courts in both England 42 and Ireland 43 have held
38. More often than not, courts and legal writers use interchangeably the terms
"reasonable man" and "average citizen" in the context of libel law and often
combine the two and speak of the "reasonable and average citizen." The most
recent example in Israeli law is c.a. 740/86, Thomarkin v. Haetzny (unpublished
decision of July 31, 1989).
39. For instance, is it defamatory to impute to another extreme poverty? Ar-
guably, sound value judgment dictates a negative answer. Such misfortune should
not cause right-thinking members of society to think less of that person. On the
other hand, relying on the community's actual or expected reactions is likely to lead
the court to answer this question affirmatively.
40. For example, is it defamatory, to call someone "a Jew" in an Arab State,
or "a black" in a conservative white community in South Africa? See SPEELMAN,
1 THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK sec. 62, at 93
(1964).
41. Judge Cardozo wrote that the judge must not follow his own personal moral
views if he is aware that they differ from those of the community. B. CARDOzO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 107-08 (1921). See also, Atiyah, Judges And
Policy, 15 ISR. L. REV. 346 (1980); h.c. 72/82 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior,
Paque Din. 23(2) 477, 521-22 (1969). Compare with F. Frankfurter, John Marshall
and the Judicial Function in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW 6, 20, 21 (1956). But see
DEVLIN, THE JUDGE Ch. 1 (1979) [hereinafter DEVLIN, THE JUDGE].
42. Slesser, L. J., in Youssoupoff c. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Ltd. 50 T.L.R 581,
587-88 (1934).
43. See R.M.E. MCMAGON & W. BiCHY, IRISH LAW OF TORTS 342 (1981).
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defamatory a statement erroneously alleging that a woman was rav-
ished. These courts have refused to speculate about what "right-
thinking members of the community" would think of such an un-
fortunate woman, or to determine what they ought to think about
her. Instead, they consider how most people do in fact react to such
information, suppressing their own preferences in morals or taste and
accepting the public as it is, in all its variety."
In many defamation cases, the courts have focused on what the
majority of people actually think rather than on what they ought to
think.45 This practice has been justified in terms of the "relational
interest" protected by defamation law." The description of the stan-
dard in such cases as the "right-thinking members of society" is
unfortunate, since it suggests that whenever there is a divergence
between what most people actually think and the judge's ethical view
of the matter, either most people in that community are not "right-
thinking," or the judge himself does not belong to that category. In
some cases, however, courts have withheld relief based on their own
moral standards . 47
Such a trend is evident especially in "informers" defamation cases48
which will be dealt with later in this article.
D. Quantitative and Ethical Qualifications of the Standard for
Determining the Defamatory Nature of a Statement
Under English law, if a statement disparages someone in the eyes
of a section of the community, but does not damage his reputation
44. Holmes, J. in Dorfman v. Afrikanse Pers Publikasies (Edns) Bpk 1966(1)
PH J9(AD) at 45 expressed it as follows: " A court deciding whether a newspaper
report is defamatory must ask itself what impression the ordinary reader would be
likely to gain from it. In such an inquiry the court must eschew any intellectual
analysis of the contents of the report and of its implications and must also be careful
not to attribute to the ordinary reader a tendency towards such analysis or an ability
to recall more than an outline or overall impression of what he or she has just
read."
45. Fricke, The Criterion of Defamation, 32 AusT. L. J. 7, 10 (1958); c.c. (Ha)
684/81, Ben Ami v. Kolbo Eiton Haifa, P.M. 5744 (1) 326, 332 (1984); R.W.M.
DIAS and B.S. MARKEsINIS, TORT LAW 320 (1984) 320. Regard to actual community
attitudes, right or wrong has been given in South Australia in Murphy v. Platerers'
Society (1949) S.A.St.R. 98.
46. Fey v. King, 194 Iowa 835, 190 N.W. 519 (1922); Note, Developments In
The Law: Defamation, 69 HARv. L. REv. 885-87 (1956) [hereinafter Note, Devel-
opments in the Law: Dafamation]; Note, The Community Segment, supra, note 24
at 1387-88.
47. J.G. FLEMb4o, Tm LAW oF TORTS 503 (7th ed. 1987) [hereinafter J.G.
FLEMING].
48. See infra notes 99-121 and accompanying text.
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in the eyes of "right-thinking members of society, generally," it is
not defamatory. 49 Thus, the standard for determining the defamatory
nature of a statement includes a quantitative element. In the United
States the criterion of the "right-thinking members of society, gen-
erally" also embraces cases in which a "substantial and respectable"
proportion of society would think less well of a person.50 The plaintiff
is not required, therefore, to show that everyone or almost everyone
who knows him thinks less of him as a result of the statement. The
statement does not fall short of being defamatory merely because
some persons in the community would not be induced thereby to
hold the plaintiff in lower esteem." On the other hand, the mere
fact that a handful of persons may be led to hold him in low esteem
does not serve to qualify the statement as defamatory.12
The words "substantial" and "respectable" denote two kinds of
qualifications imposed on the standard of "the right-thinking mem-
49. Tolley v. Fry & Sons, Ltd., [1930] 1 K.B. 467, 479. Some scholars have
advocated a change in this law in the spirit of the American model of this standard.
See STREET, Tim LAW OF TORTS 288, 292 (1976). See also, J.G. FLEMING, supra
note 47; Hepburn v. TCN [1983] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 682 (C.A. 1988); Quigley v. Creation
Ltd., 1971 I.R. 269, 272 (per Walsh, J. who seemed to apply the American model
in Ireland).
50. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 777 (5th ed. 1984). [hereinafter PROSSER].
In the leading American case, Justice Holmes said:
(1)iability is not a question of a majority vote... No falsehood is thought
about or even known by all the world. No conduct is hated by all. That
it will be known by a large number and will lead an appreciable fraction
of that number to regard the plaintiff with contempt is enough to do her
practical harm..It seems to us impossible to say that the obvious tendency
of what is imputed to the plaintiff by this advertisement is not seriously
to hurt her standing with a considerable and respectable class in the com-
munity. Therefore it was the plaintiff's right to prove her case.
Peck v. Tribute Co. 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909). This test was adopted by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559, comments d and e (1977). See also Herrmann
v. Newark Morning Ledger Co. 48 N.J. Super. 420, 138 A.2d 61, 71 (1958); Tartaglia
v. Townsend, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 693, 477 N.E.2d 178, 180-81 (1985); Nash v. Keen
Pub. Corp., 498 A.2d 348, 351 (N.H. 1985); Duchesnaye v. Munro Enterprises,
Inc., 480 A.2d 123, 127 (N.H. 1984).
51. In Berry v. Irish Times Ltd., 1973 I.R. 368, 381, McLoughlin, J., explained
it as follows:
Friends of the plaintiff, if asked what effect the publication had on their
minds would probably say ... I didn't believe a word of it. But there
must be others whom he may not even know but who know him on account
of his exalted position and good repute who taking the publication to be
true, would look on him with disgust and contempt ....
52. See 2 F.V. HARPER, F. JAMEs, JR., 0.S. GRAY, Tim LAW OF TORTS § 5.1,
at 25. (2nd ed. 1986) [hereinafter HARPER, JAMEs & GRAY].
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bers of society." These are a quantitative qualification and an ethical
qualification." The qualitative aspect of defamation law bears upon
two different, albeit interdependent inquiries. The distinction between
these two inquiries has often escaped courts and commentators. The
first inquiry deals with the content of the statement in question and
examines whether the statement reasonably can be interpreted as
communicating the particular message or information alleged by the
plaintiff. The second inquiry deals with the normative evaluation of
that message or information, i.e. with the question of whether the
statement is defamatory.
In the first inquiry, it is necessary to construe the statement in its
ordinary sense, in the way the parties to whom it was addressed, or
who have had access to it, would ordinarily understand it. Courts
do not conduct empirical studies. They assume that recipients of a
statement are likely to construe it as would a reasonable person of
ordinary intelligence possessing the recipients' knowledge of the cir-
cumstances.14 The true meaning of some statements often is hidden
behind obscure words, highly technical or professional terms of art,
and the like." The average reader would not grasp their meaning
and would therefore have no reason to regard them as defamatory.
In cases where the defamatory nature of the statement is indis-
putable, yet none of its recipients are aware or likely to be aware
of its defamatory nature, and no one is likely to transmit it to someone
who is aware of its true nature, an action for defamation can hardly
be justifiable. However, one recipient's awareness of the defamatory
nature of the statement is enough to establish prima facie the tort
of defamation.16 The number of such recipients is relevant only to
53. In his explication of the substantial and respectable class of society standard
in Peck, 214 U.S. at 190, Justice Holmes was describing sufficient conditions, not
necessary ones. HARI'ER, JAmEs & GRAY, supra note 52, at 25.
54. This assumption embraces the case in which the recipients are more knowl-
edgeable than the average citizen. Thus it has been held that it is fair to impute to
the ordinary reader of a certain publication a "somewhat higher standard of education
and intelligence and a greater interest in and understanding of financial matters than
newspaper readers in general have." Channing v. South African Financial Gazette,
Ltd., [1966] 3 SA 470, 474 (A).
55. Note, The Community Segment, supra note 24 at 1387-88.
56. See Note, Developments in the Law: Defamation, supra note 46 at 885-887.
Compare with J.H. HENDERSON, JR. & R.N. PEARSON, THE TORT PROCESS 1001 (2d
ed. 1981) and Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co., 251 N.Y. 250, 167 N.E. 432 (1929).
Sometimes, the danger of harm in this situation can be particularly great, such as
when the recipients have derived their special information solely as a result of their
business or social contacts with the plaintiff.
[Vol. 19:503
INFORMERS DEFAMATION
the issue of damages. Once a statement's meaning is clear, a court
should move to the second inquiry and decide whether this meaning
is defamatory. The quantitative aspect of this inquiry is considered
in the process of the legal evaluation of the nature of the statement.
There should be some correlation between the number of people who
would think less of the plaintiff, as a result of a statement and the
likelihood that the courts will find the statement defamatory.
The quantitative criterion inherent in or imposed on the standard
for determining the defamatory nature of a statement can be explained
in terms of expediency. One goal of this test is to save administrative
costs, for example, by preventing a proliferation of defamation ac-
tions5 7 particularly in cases which should be regarded de minimis 8
such as where plaintiff's esteem has been slightly lowered amongst
some distant relatives or others whose opinion probably is of no
particular importance to him. After all, ". . . the judiciary cannot
concern itself with minor social frictions when serious clashes
abound." 5 9 The decisive factor here, however, is not the number of
recipients but the substantiality of the injury inflicted upon the plain-
tiff. A person has a genuine interest in his standing in the community.
His conduct is conditioned by the regard of those about him, i.e.
family, friends, neighbors and prospective acquaintances, no matter
what they number. If the statement lowers the plaintiff in the eyes
of relatively few recipients, but if their opinion is highly important
to him, his defamation action should not be denied on the basis of
the small size of this index group. 60
The ethical criterion within the standard for determining the de-
famatory nature of a statement demands that the persons in whose
estimation the plaintiff sinks must be "respectable". 6' This rule is
57. See generally, Maher and Evans, Hard Cases, Floodgates, and the New
Rhetoric, 8 U. TASMANIA L. REv. 96 (1985).
58. In light of the expected consumption of public resources (for example, where
the feelings of a mere family unit are mildly offended), the cost to the public is
unjustifiable.
59. Note, The Community Segment, supra note 24 at 1390.
60. GREEN, MALONE, REDRICK & RAHL CASES ON INnJuss TO RELATIONS 332
(1959); Probert, Defamation: a Camouflage of Psychic Interests: the Beginning of
a Behavioral Analysis 15 VAmD. L. REv. 1173, 1178 (1962). See generally, Post,
The Social Foundation of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74
CALiF. L. REv. 691 (1986).
61. Note, The Community Segment, supra note 24 at 1388-89 see also J.G.
FLEMING, supra note 47.
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commonly justified in terms of public policy.62 At least three justi-
fications are sheltered beneath this umbrella:
(1) Minimizing encroachments on freedom of speech;
(2) Safeguarding the prestige of the judiciary;
(3) Discouraging "anti-social" conduct.
The first justification is anchored in public law. Underlying it is
the feeling that since the law of defamation, by nature, imposes a
limitation on the right to free speech, defamation should not be
interpreted broadly so as to avoid jeopardizing the existence of that
vital constitutional right. According to this view, in determining what
is defamatory, society would be better off disregarding opinions or
reactions of outcasts, especially if their number is negligible.6 3 There-
fore, any limitation on free speech should be confined to statements
likely to be regarded as defamatory by most members of that society.
In the absence of such a limitation, life in society will be intolerable
since almost any utterance might give birth to an action for defa-
mation. Assume, for instance, a society in which a certain political
party's platform is regarded by the vast number of the populace as
posing a threat to the democratic process and carrying loathesome
goals. Is it defamatory to call someone erroneously "an ardent sup-
porter" of that party? It is certainly plausible to assume that such
a statement will lower the plaintiff's reputation in the eyes of most
people in that society and will therefore regarded as defamatory.4
Assume now that an active member of that party is described in
another statement as a member of the opposing party? Is this state-
ment defamatory? Distinguished writers tend to answer this question
in the affirmative, claiming that any statement about a person's
politics or even philosophical belief could become defamatory when
62. Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common Law, 42 HARv. L. REv. 76,
92 (1928) [hereinafter Winfield, Public Policy]. Winfield defined public policy as
"a principle of judicial legislation or interpretation founded on the current needs
of the community." The operation of public policy tends to be negative. Symmons,
The Function and Effect of Public Policy in Contemporary Common Law, 51 AusTL.
L. J. 185 (1977). Rodriguez v. Speyer Brothers (1919) A.C. 59, 79 (per Lord Haldane);
Hiers, Normative Analysis In Judicial Determination Of Public Policy, 3 J. L. &
RELIG. 77 (1985). See generally J.B. BELL, POLICY ARGUMENTS IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS
(1983).
63. Restatement of Torts, § 559, comment e (1938).
64. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 52 at 31. In general, the cases tend to
find it defamatory to say that one believes in political or sociological principles that
are objectionable to the average person in the community.
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it is false and could adversely affect reputation even in the view of
a small minority.65 Although it is quite possible that the plaintiffs in
both cases will prevail, there is a basic difference between the two
cases. In the first one, the statement is clearly defamatory. In the
second case, a false statement according to which a certain person
is a member of a particular legitimate and respectable political party
is not defamatory. Nonetheless it might be actionable, once a case
of "true innuendo"' ' is established, but this is a different story
altogether.
The freedom of expression justification of the ethical criterion
standard for determining the defamatory nature of a statement stands
on a shaky foundation. This ethical qualification seems to undermine
the democratic process rather than strengthen it. Society consists of
people of differing and divergent views and reactions. Protection of
the interest of the individual in his reputation should not be confined
to those members of the community whose views and moral standards
conform or are at least seem sympathetic to the majority. 67 Such a
conception discriminates among citizens according to their views and
moral convictions.
Moreover, the qualification seems to be unnecessary from a con-
stitutional law viewpoint. To the extent that the right to freedom of
expression needs protection against unwarranted encroachments, such
protection is provided by the numerous privileges bestowed upon
defendants by the legal system. It is unjustifiable to regard the goal
of securing freedom of expression as a factor in determining whether
a statement is defamatory. This determination should focus exclusively
65. Id.
66. See GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER § 95 at 49-51 (8th ed. 1981).
67. In the landmark decision of Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 151 F.2d
733, 734 (2d Cir. 1945), Judge Learned Hand said: "A man may value his reputation
even among those who do not embrace the prevailing moral standards . . .We do
not believe, therefore, that we need say whether 'right-thinking' people would harbor
similar feelings .... It is enough if there be some . . .who would feel so, even
though they would be 'wrong-thinking' people if they did". Another writer expressed
a similar view:
The social purpose underlying the action for defamation is to protect
members of society against irresponsible or malicious utterances which are
false and damaging to plaintiff's name. Unless some extrinsic policy in-
tervenes, then by definition the action should be available whenever the
plaintiff's reputation has been disparaged by a false statement, even in the
extreme case where the esteem lost be that of but one man and he is a
moron, a lunatic, or a murderer.
Note, The Community Segment, supra note 24 at 1389-90.
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upon the statement's potential and actual impact on the esteem of
its target. Plaintiffs should not be required to carry the additional
burden of proving that their action does not interfere unduly with
the right of the defendants to freedom of expression. The burden of
proving the contrary should rest with the defendants. Once a plaintiff
proves a substantial loss of esteem as a result of a statement, he
ought to be allowed to go on with his action. Yet he still has a long
way to go. Overcoming the "defamatory" hurdle is only one of the
requirements imposed upon plaintiffs in defamation litigation.
A second justification given for the ethical qualification is the
prestige and public image of the judiciary. Maintaining the image of
an independent, professional, moral and neutral institution is essential
for the judiciary. Some argue that if a plaintiff prevails in a defa-
mation action dealing with utterances which are not defamatory
according to the majority of the population, yet which present the
plaintiff in a bad light within a specific immoral, illegal, or anti-
social minority group, there is a danger that the public will misin-
terpret that decision as judicial endorsement of the activities of the
antisocial group. 68 As a result of such a decision, the public esteem
of the court may be lowered. 69
Courts must preserve their respectability. Respect for the court is
instrumental in attaining and maintaining respect for law. That image
is so vital that the goal of maintaining it is sometimes given priority
68. Apparently, McLoughlin, J., in Berry v. Irish Times Ltd., [1973] I.R. 368,
381 accepted this argument in principle. In Israel, Barak, J., wrote in h.c. 910/86,
Resler v. Minister of Defence, P.D. 42 (2) 441, 495 (1988): "It]he public is likely
to miss the distinction between a judicial review and a political critic and might
identify judicial review of a political matter with the matter itself. It may regard a
legal decision according to which a certain governmental activity is legal as a judicial
statement which endorses this activity."
69. According to Lord Devlin, "A judge's impartiality may be gravely prejudiced
by an active judicial role, where there is no community consensus. In controversial
areas activism of this kind is bound to seem like taking sides and so impartiality
which is the judge's greatest and most important attribute is threatened." DEvLN,
THE JUDGE, supra note 41 at 3-9. Compare with Atiyah, supra note 41 at 350, 355,
357-58, 362, 368-69. In Baker v. Carr, 82 S.Ct. 691, 737 (1962) Justice Frankfurter
asserted: "The Court's authority... ultimately rests on sustained public confidence
in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the court's complete
detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention
from injecting itself unto the clash of political forces in political settlement." See
also W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY at 45. For similar views in Israel,
see Landau, D.P., in h.c. 390/79, Duikat v. Government of Israel, P.D. 34(1) 1,
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even over the most basic duty of the judiciary, namely, the admin-
istration of justice in the individual case. 70
Thus, according to one view:
when the grant of justice would cause public scandal, the merits of
the individual case must yield to the necessities of the law. The law
needs moral support and in return it must be prepared to support
public morality, and where that would be outraged by the use of
the law, then, but only then, should the law refuse its aid. 7' That
is one of the major reasons why many courts have refused to "soil
their hands" by refusing to rectify genuine wrongs. Two principles
seem to be in a constant clash: the principle that "[elvery one is
entitled to his just deserts whether he has broken the law or kept
it
' 
72 and the principle that "no polluted hand shall touch the pure
fountains of justice." 73
The latter is the main rationale of the doctrine of ex dolo malo
non oritur actio; namely, no court will lend its aid to a man who
70. The common law courts have recognized a number of community interests
and have allowed them to override demands of fairness which might be said to flow
purely from the relations of the parties inter se. See Winfield, Public Policy, supra
note 62 at 76. One of these interests is the interest in the integrity of public
administration, including the administration of justice. See generally Lucke, The
Common Law: Judicial Impartiality And Judge-Made Law, 98 LAW Q. REv. 29
(1982). Compare with Barak, J. in Resler, h.c. 910/86, P.D. 42(2) at 496 (1988).
71. DEVLN, supra note 37, at 59. It does not mean however, that the courts
should hesitate to fulfill their task in the face of stormy public controversy. Thus
Witkon, J., wrote in h.c. 72/62, Shalit v. Minister of the Interior, P.D. 23(2) 477,
522 (1969): "It is axiomatic for me that the court must at times take up a position
on ideological questions and not be apprehensive about its competence to do so or
about the effect that may have upon its repute . . .even if the court's view on a
controversial ideological question is not acceptable to the public at large but only
to part of it, who would doubt that even then it fulfills a legitimate and important
judicial function?" Similarly in h.c. 428/89, 429/86, 431/86, 446/86, 448/86, 463/
86, m.a. 320/86 Barzilay v. Government of Israel, P.D. 40(3) 505 (1986). Ben-
Porath, D.P., wrote at p. 584: "We are obliged to adopt an attitude, even with
regard to matters of public controversy and even though part of the public may
not approve of that attitude".
Barak, J., added at p. 585: "We are aware of the public controversy that is
raging around this matter. In the dynamics of political life our judgment here may
well come to be used as a lever in the struggle between the opposing political forces.
That we regret, but we have to fulfill "our function" and our duty as judges.
72. See DEVLIN, supra note 37, at 59. Compare with Cohen, D.P., in h.c. 320/
80, Kawasme v. Minister of Defence, P. D. 35(3) 113, 130 (1981) "It is common
knowledge that the gates of this Court are wide open for every person, be he the
most despicable, dangerous and corrupt criminal." But see Landau, D.P., id. at
123 and D. Levin, J., in h.c. 131/86, 24/86, 669/85 Kahana v. Chairman of the
Knesset et al P.D. 40 (4) (1986) 393, 403-06.
73. Collins v. Blantern (1767) 2 Wilson 341, 350 (per Wilmut C.J.).
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founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act. 74 Yet, as
Professor Shand lucidly stated: "Our system of justice is not a
beautiful garden ornament but is (or should be) a piece of machinery
for social engineering which may occasionally require its operators
to put on overalls and get their hands dirty." 7 5
In defamation cases, however, the courts are not required to dirty
their hands. When a court recognizes that a certain imputation is
harmful in the minds of the "wrong-minded" recipients of the state-
ment, it does not mean that the court "adopts" as its own the
standards of those "wrong-minded" recipients. Neither does it mean
that the court endorses the "right-mindedness" of the opinions of
such recipients. 76 After all, recognition of fact is not an approval of
principle. The potential damage to the courts' image, due to a possible
misinterpretation of judicial decisions in defamation cases, should
not justify leaving a plaintiff who suffered a substantial loss of esteem
without any legal remedy. In many cases, courts can avoid this
problem by cleverly drafting their decisions. A judge confronted with
innocent yet false statements attributing to the plaintiff praiseworthy
conduct that nonetheless lowers him in the eyes of his neighbors and
friends, can find for the plaintiff and at the same time emphasize
that it is generally not defamatory to make such a statement. A judge
could even commend the conduct or opinion in question.
The third common justification given to the ethical qualification
of the standard for determining the defamatory nature of a statement
rests on the judiciary's ethical and educational foundations. 77
Judges are repeatedly required to interject their conceptions of what
respectable and sound thinking persons should do or think and to
disregard the actual or expected reaction of the "wrong-thinking"
members of society. According to this view, courts should refuse
relief because to allow recovery would encourage wrong beliefs and
might be conducive to illegality or immorality in the community.
74. Grodecki, In Pari Delictio Potior Est Conditio Defendents, 71 LAW Q. REv.
254, 265-66 (1955).
75. Shand, Unblinkering The Unruly Horse: Public Policy In The Law Of
Contract, 30 CAmBRIDGE L. J. 144, 152 (1972).
76. 2 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 52 at 32.
77. A judge's main task, according to professor Fiss, is to give meaning to public
values. See Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term Foreword: the Forms of Justice,
93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1979); Note, The Community Segment, supra note 24 at
1393. In h.c. 72/62, Shalit v. Minister of the Interior, at p. 522, Witkon, J., spoke
about "the judge's ability to persuade and educate" and described him as "one of
the elements that influence public opinion and fashion the image of society".
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This logic is flawed. A denial of recovery is likely to have no effect
upon the wrong-thinkers, but it will permit intentional harm to go
uncompensated. This approach will allow a person who wishes to
derogate his rival to publish unfounded and damaging statements
regarding the latter with impunity, so long as he carefully tailors the
statement to escape the majoritarian defamation standard. Moreover,
it seems that the educational role of the judiciary underlying this
justification is often overestimated. It is unrealistic to assume that
judicial opinions delivered in defamation litigation are widely read
and understood or that they significantly influence patterns of social
behavior.78 Furthermore, those few members of society who under-
stand judicial opinions under the ethical standard are likely to derive
from them the following unbecoming lessons:
(1) The law of defamation does not provide equal protection for all
members of society;
(2) It is legally possible to ruin another with lies provided that one
does it cleverly, selecting an allegation which the courts will find
difficult to regard as defamatory since the lies comply with the
majoritarian view.
(3) "Right-thinking members of society" either do not exist or their
thinking is completely detached from reality. For instance, courts
have attributed to the "right-thinking members of society" the view
that it is appropriate and even commendable to assist the police in
bringing one's best friend or a family member to justice.
The divergence between the actual sentiment prevailing in society
and its normative evaluation by the courts stirred one writer to note,
"Respect for the law is not enhanced by judicial assumptions that
are known to be factually wrong by almost all laymen and most
lawyers as well." 7 9
The authors of a leading 8° torts treatise reject the ethical qualifi-
cation of the standard for determining the defamatory nature of a
statement. Harper, James, and Gray claim that what matters in
defamation is the existence of community opprobrium, not respect-
ability. Certain kinds of defamation can be protected explicitly by
giving specific reasons for the protection without reflections on the
78. In Dorfman v. Afrikanse pers Publikasies (Edns) Bpk, Bpk 1966(1) PH J9
(AD) at 45, it was stated that in view of the mass of material in a newspaper it is
in general unlikely that the ordinary reader would pursue and ponder a single report
in isolation.
79. See HARPER, JAmEs & GRAY, supra note 52 at 35-36, n.45.
80. Id. at 32.
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"respectability" of persons or of their views. They conclude with the
following persuasive words:
[tihe courts face a problem of their own making. Because they have
defined defamation in terms of "respectable" community opinion,
they may imagine that if they recognize the imputation of informing
as defamatory, they thereby confer an official finding of "respect-
ability" on the opprobrium. Abandoning this ethical qualification
would enable the courts to avoid the absurdity of decisions that
deny innocent noncriminal redress for truly harmful falsehoods merely
because they involve views or sentiments which can be regarded as
not "respectable" or as "anti-social."'"
The merit of these words is evident in the informers defamation cases.
E. Informers and Defamation
Is it defamatory to allege that a certain person informed the au-
thorities of the illegal activities of others and thereby assisted the
police in bringing these people to justice? In the leading English
case,8 2 the defendant suggested that the plaintiff, a member of a golf
club, had informed the police of the existence of gambling machines
in that club. The plaintiff argued that the suggestion meant he had
been disloyal to the members of the club and devoid of all true
sporting spirit. Hilberry, J., allowed the action, but the Court of
Appeal accepted defendant's appeal, stating that: "to say of a man
that he has put in motion the proper machinery for suppressing crime
is a thing which cannot on the face of it be defamatory." 83
In Ireland, an Irish priest brought an action against a person who
had suggested that the priest had informed against a certain class of
Irish criminals. 4 The court assumed that the class which disapproved
of the alleged acts of informing was a minority group. Although the
court accepted that the plaintiff had been exposed to great odium
amongst that class, the judges stated: "The very circumstances which
will make a person be regarded with disfavor by the criminal classes
will raise his character in the estimation of right-thinking men. We
81. Id. at 34. The treatise authors point out that courts could, for instance,
refuse to protect a criminal's interest in a reputation for professional proficiency,
on the ground that if the defamation is injurious to the criminal's career, society's
interest in hindering criminal careers outweighs its interest in affording vindication
to the defamed.
82. Byrne v. Deane, [1937 1 K.B. 818.
83. Id. at 840.
84. Mawe v. Piggott, [18691 4 Ir.R.-CL 54.
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can only regard the estimation in which a man is held by society
generally."85
A century later, in Berry v. Irish Times Ltd. ,86 a newspaper pho-
tograph suggested that the plaintiff, a senior civil servant and the
head of the Department of Justice, helped in the arrest of two Irish
republicans in England. By a 3 to 2 majority, the Irish Supreme
Court decided that it is not libel per se to say of an Irish citizen
that he helped to bring to justice another Irish citizen convicted of
breaking the law in another country. It does not matter that the
person so convicted was motivated by a desire to resolve, by force
of arms, a dispute existing between his country and the country in
which the offense was committed when there was no state of war
between the two countries.8 7 The minority judges88 regarding the
statement as defamatory expressed the view that any Irishman of
normal experience and intelligence would consider the statement de-
famatory since it portrayed the plaintiff as a traitor.
The Scottish courts have not followed the same course. In Graham
v. Ray, 9 the defendant circulated a report that the plaintiff gave
information to the excise officers against a distiller in order that he
might obtain one half of the penalties awarded. The court found for
the plaintiff, asserting: "If you publish on the streets that a man is
a common informer, is that not slander? It may be perfectly legitimate
to give information, but an informer is by no means a popular
character." 9 One justification given for that decision was that the
plaintiff was alleged to be an informer for a reward. 91
In the leading South African case, 92 a student was alleged to be
doing espionage work for the police in the university. She claimed
that the publication lowered her in the estimation of many students
and others. She argued that the appellation "spy" is an opprobrious
one. Moreover, to say of a university student that she has deliberately
spied upon fellow students whose confidence and trust she may be
85. Id. at 62.
86. 1973 N.Ir. 368.
87. Id. at 375. Dalaige, J., conceded, however, that in similar cases explicitly
calling a person an informer might be actionable.
88. Id. FitzGerald, J., at 378 and McLoughlin, J., at 379-82.
89. 13 Sess. Cas. 634 (1851).
90. Id. at 636 (per Lord Fullerton).
91. See Kennedy v. Allen, 10 Sess. Cas. 1293 (1848); Winn v. Quillan, 2 Sess.
Cas. 322 (1899).
92. Prinsloo v. South African Associated Newspaper, Ltd., [1959] 2 S.A. 693.
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presumed to enjoy implies disloyalty and is therefore defamatory.
The court refused to take a sectional view and held that she had not
been lowered in the estimation of members of society generally.
In the leading United States case, 93 the defendant spread the false
report that the plaintiff, a gasoline station operator, habitually in-
formed on truck drivers violating the I.C.C. regulations. Despite
evidence of a decline in plaintiff's business, the court ruled against
the plaintiff, holding he was charged merely with doing that which
he had a duty to do. The court justified its decision as follows: "To
permit the injured plaintiff to recover would be contrary to the public
interest in that it would penalize the law-abiding citizen and give
comfort to the law violator. It would impede law enforcement for
the benefit of the anti-social." 94
This justification makes very little sense. It is difficult to conceive
how these results would follow.95 Since the plaintiff in that case
arguably did not help law enforcement, it is dubious at best to describe
a judgment in his favor as a victory for the anti-social and a blow
to law enforcement. The court in this case unfortunately awarded
undeserved protection to the author of the false statement and left
remediless the plaintiff whose loss was substantial.
Underlying many of these decisions is the view that informing the
appropriate authorities of any kind of illegal activity is commendable
or at least does not entail any negative reaction on the part of the
majority of the public. This view is extremely difficult to share.
Informers seem to be resented by even the law-abiding members of
society.96 McLoughlin, J., supplied one possible explanation: "It may
be that one's views on matters of this sort are conditioned by one's
up-bringing and education. The school sneak who, however justified,
"spills to the head" was regarded with contempt by all his fellows." ' 97
Courts should not play "legal ostrich"9 and claim that informers
are odious only to those who support crime. This is perfectly true
with regard to Shaha.
93. Connelley v. McKay, 176 Misc. 685, 28 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
94. Id. at 687.
95. HARPER, JAM s & GRAy, supra note 52, at 35-36 n.45.
96. See Riesman, supra note 23, at 1302; 2 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note
52, at 35.
97. McLoughlin, supra note 51, at 382.
98. See Note, The Community Segment, supra note 24, at 1393.
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F. The Shaha Decision - An Appraisal
The decision of the Israeli Supreme Court in Shaha has two facets.
On the one hand, some of the views expressed by judges in this case
are daring, original and innovative. On the other hand, the decision
itself seems wrong and unfortunate. On the theoretical level, one
should praise and welcome the decision of two of the three judges
to eschew the standard of "the right thinking members of society
generally" in favor of a flexible standard almost free of the quan-
titative and ethical qualifications usually imposed for determining
whether a statement is defamatory.
Elon, J., expressly omitted the notions of "considerable" and
"respectable" from his definition of that standard. He expressed his
readiness to regard a statement which is not seen as offensive by the
majority of the public as defamatory if it is likely to injure a person
within a small and even peculiar group. Ben-Porath, D.P., seemed
to be in accord with this view. She acknowledged that calling someone
an "informer" might be defamatory, even if the alleged informing
served the national security interests.
Both judges believed, however, that courts have discretionary power
to disallow defamation actions for public policy reasons. 99 This power
should be exercised cautiously after conducting a balancing process
in which factors such as the conduct of the parties and the gravity
of the allegation are taken into account. A drastic decision to disallow
otherwise justifiable defamation actions for public policy reasons
should be taken only in exceptional cases in which the courts reach
the conclusion that the interest in protecting the right to live free of
defamation should be sacrificed for the sake of assuring that wrong
conceptions or deeds, especially ones which undermine the rule of
law, will not be legitimized.
It seems, therefore, that under Israeli law, as it now stands, the
requirement that the statement in question be defamatory is prima
99. It is not altogether clear whether in this context these public policy consid-
erations were employed as an integral component of the substantive law of defamation
(and more specifically as an ethical qualification of the standard for determining
whether a statement is defamatory) or as an independent matter external to the
substantive law of defamation according to which courts are vested with inherent
power to deny actions, even seemingly sound ones, for public policy reasons. It is
difficult to draw from the various judgments a clear cut answer to this puzzle. In
this case, wherein the same outcome is predicted either way, it is unnecessary as
well.
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facie fulfilled once the plaintiff establishes that the statement is likely
to lower him in the estimation of the community members to which
he affiliates himself. Nevertheless, in exceptional cases, liability will
be denied for public policy reasons. Was Shaha one of those "ex-
ceptional" cases? The Israeli Supreme Court thought so. The sound-
ness of this decision is doubtful.
The facts of Shaha are unique. The only case which it resembles
is Berry v. Irish Times Ltd. 100 Had the plaintiff there decided to bring
his action in an English court rather than in an Irish one, the similarity
between these two cases would have been more meaningful. At first
blush, the very decision of the plaintiff in Shaha to sue in an Israeli
court seems somewhat bizarre.
Usually, defamation actions are principally brought to vindicate
the plaintiff's reputation. Perhaps the Shaha plaintiff wished to clear
his name in the eyes of his Armenian congregation and colleagues.
Perhaps he sought compensation for his pecuniary damage or was
motivated by revenge. While the plaintiff in Shaha was not an Arab,
it is clear that the decision of the Israeli Supreme Court applies with
at least equal force to similar actions by Palestinian plaintiffs. Yet
the very idea that Palestinians suspected of collaboration with the
Israeli authorities will sue for defamation in Israeli courts is odd. It
seems a senseless and futile thing to do. The members of their index
group are hardly likely to respect or even accept the Israeli court's
decision on such matters. At least some of these members are likely
to regard a successful action as a final proof of the plaintiff's trai-
torous behavior.
Actually, the nature of the allegations made in Shaha raises the
question whether any court, either in Israel or in the Arab States,
can be perceived by all potential litigants as capable of handling the
dispute fairly. It is extremely difficult for the defendant to establish
the defense of truth in an Israeli court. Potential witnesses are likely
to hesitate to testify, even indirectly, against the interests of the Israeli
authorities, let alone expose themselves as persons who knew the
whereabouts of Israeli agents and "spied" on them. Israeli intelligence
officers can hardly be expected to make themselves available for such
litigation. In the Kingdom of Jordan, on the other hand, the parties
would not be able to call any Israeli officials to the witness stand.
The same is true in the local courts in Judea and Samaria. These
100. 1973 I.R. 368.
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courts do not exercise authority over the Israeli military or admin-
istrative personnel.
To summon any such personnel, the court would need special
permission from the Israeli authorities. Such permission is unlikely
to be granted in such a case. Since the plaintiff in Shaha was denied
entry into the Kingdom of Jordan, he did not have much choice in
terms of forum shopping. Thus he brought his action in the Israeli
courts. The decision to strike it down was unfortunate. It violated
the fundamental purpose for which defamation actions are available.
It left remediless a plaintiff who had suffered not only pecuniary
damage and a substantial loss of esteem but whose very life and
health were seriously endangered. It enables wrong-doers to lie with
impunity and to endanger life without fear of sanction. The Israeli
authorities surely did not benefit from the decision, which certainly
did not and could not encourage recruitment of informants. 0'
The Israeli courts could and should have reached a different out-
come. The statements in question were clearly defamatory. They were
made in Arabic to Arab ears and eyes. They were published exclusively
in Arab newspapers read mostly by Arabs. Since the recipients of
the statements were almost exclusively Arabs, it was only natural and
logical to determine whether the statements were defamatory ac-
cording to the reactions and opinions of those recipients. It is artificial
and wrong to rely instead on the standard of the Jewish population
of Israel. According to the latter standard, stating in a Jordanian
newspaper that a certain person in East Jerusalem is a supporter of
the PLO is defamatory, though it raises the victim's esteem in the
eyes of the recipients of that information. This way, the whole purpose
of defamation law is turned upside down since it denies damages in
a case of a substantial loss of esteem and awards damages for a
statement which actually increases the plaintiff's esteem in the eyes
of others.
Moreover, the Israeli society itself is not and should not be regarded
as homogeneous. It consists of a Jewish majority and a substantial
Arab minority. The judges should be sensitive to the possibility that
a decision such as Shaha might be seen as an one-sided attempt to
extend the conventions of the Jewish majority to the larger society.
Furthermore, it is not certain that even under the "Jewish standard"
101. Informants are given no protection. Defendants will defeat defamation claims
either by the defense of truth or by the Shaha rule.
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the statements in question were not defamatory. Some Jews in Israel
support, in various degrees of intensity, the Palestinian claim for self
determination. At least some of them are likely to regard statements
as the one made in Shaha as defamatory.
Many Israelis, though they may support Israel's policy and activities
in the occupied territories and may be fully aware of the vital im-
portance of recruitment of local informers, do not necessarily respect
informers, particularly those who inform for reward. These Israelis
may regard statements of the kind made in Shaha as defamatory.
G. Alternative Approaches to the Informer/Defamation Dilemna
The fear that allowing the action would validate and encourage
wrong beliefs did not justify the decision to deny the plaintiff his
right to live free of defamation. The Court could have permitted
recovery while decrying the social ethics of the local community.
Moreover, the plaintiff could have established a clear case of in-
nuendo. o2
The innuendo was that the plaintiff had been portrayed as un-
trustworthy, treacherous, capable of betraying his friends, a person
to be shunned and boycotted. He was actually described as a hypocrite
since he had presented himself as a friend of the Arabs, while in
fact he had assisted the Jews. 03
Courts should exercise a great deal of caution in relying on innuendo
to determine the outcome of a defamation action. Thus, even a
statement such as: "Mr. X ardently supported the nomination of
Justice Y to the Supreme Court, claiming that Y is the greatest jurist
in the country" can turn out to be defamatory if Mr. X is known
for his view that Mr. Y. is a mediocre jurist. By relying on innuendo,
the intrinsic content of the statement: "The plaintiff collaborated
with the Israeli authorities," is irrelevant to the decision of whether
102. The Defamation Prohibition Law, § 3, 5725-1965 Sefef Ha-Chukkim No.
464 of the 1st Av, 5725, p. 240 (30th July 1965); 19 Laws of the State of Israel
254 (authorized translation from the Hebrew prepared at the Ministry of Justice)
provides, "It shall be immaterial whether the defamatory matter is expressed directly
and completely or whether it and its application to the person who alleges that he
is injured thereby can be understood from the publication or from extrinsic circum-
stances or partly from the former and partly from the latter."
103. The dissenting judge in Byrne v. Deane, [1937] 1 K.B. 818, 830-31, sidestepped
this difficulty by classifying the case as one in which there was an innuendo that
the plaintiff was disloyal to the members of the club. From this one can conclude
that the plaintiff was pretending to do what he was not and therefore was practicing
deceit.
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he should be compensated. The court need not express its opinion
as to whether that statement is defamatory. What counts is the
meaning of that statement in the light of the additional facts. In its
totality the message may be that the plaintiff is a hypocrite, an
irresponsible person, and an unfit Archbishop of the Armenian Church
in East Jerusalem. As such, the statement clearly is defamatory.
Indeed, the plaintiff could have based his action independently on
the claim that the statements in question were an attack on his
competence or fitness as a public official since they portrayed him
as unfit to successfully fulfill the duties of his office in the local
church.' °4 Such words might be defamatory according to Section 1
(3) of the Defamation Prohibition Law 5725-1965.10s Under this Sub-
Section06 the plaintiff did not have to prove malice, falsehood 07 and
pecuniary damage.108 If he was able to prove these elements, he could
104. Van Lonkhuyzen v. Daily News Co., 161 N.W. 979, 982 (1917). To say of
a minister that he is an interloper, a meddler, and a spreader of distrust, discontent,
and sedition is defamatory.
105. Sefef Ha-Chukkim No. 464 of the 1st Av, 5725, p. 240 (30th July 1965).
Defamation is defined in Section 1 as follows: "1. Defamatory matter is anything
the publication of which may
(1) lower a person in the estimation of others- or expose him to hatred, contempt
or ridicule on their part;
(2) bring a person into disrepute because of acts, conduct or qualities attributed to
him;
(3) injure a person in his office, whether it be a public or any other office, or in
his business, vocation or profession;
(4) bring a person into disrepute because of his origin or religion;
in this section, 'person' means an individual and a body corporate."
The definition of "defamatory matter" is inapt. It is not comprehensive enough.
It is based on a list of categories rather than on a broad and general principle. Its
application is problematic with regard to statements which do not lower the esteem
of another person, such as statements imputing poverty, physical peculiarities, loath-
some disease or conveying the impression that a woman had been raped, statements
causing neither hatred nor contempt but rather pity or sympathy. The various
categories overlap. It seems that section 1 (1) is a general one and sections (2) and
(4) refer to two of its applications, and the law could have deleted them or combined
them. Section (2) seems dispensable (included in (1)).
106. Despite the seemingly clear language of this subsection, it is questionable
whether mere proof that a statement may injure a person in his office, business,
vocation, or profession will suffice to establish the defamatory nature of that
statement. A literal interpretation of this subsection likely will extend unjustifiably
the boundaries of the tort of defamation, encompassing statements which have
nothing to do with injury to reputation.
107. However, truth can be a defense when there is public interest in the statement.
108. See Friedman, Injurious Falsehood and Defamation - The Option of Em-
ploying Sec. 1(3) of the Defamation Prohibition Law 5725-1965, 36 HAPRAKLIT 77
(1984).
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probably have resorted to the tort of injurious falsehood.' °9 Under
this tort, the statement need not be defamatory, merely false. 110 It
is enough that a small faction of the population would be influenced
by the statement to boycott the plaintiff and economically injure
him, even though there is nothing wrong in the statement from the
perspective of the majority of the population."'
Another alternative worth exploring in order to sidestep the issue
of whether a collaboration with the Israeli authorities is "wrong"
would have been to resort to choice of law rules. Undoubtedly, the
Israeli court had jurisdiction in this case, in light of the fact that
the Jordanian newspaper was distributed in East Jerusalem. It was
possible, however, to argue that the Jordanian law should have
governed the action. The Israeli rules on conflict of laws are basically
judge-made law traditionally following English Common Law prin-
ciples." 2 In recent years, however, the Israeli courts have demonstrated
a tendency to favor the Restatement (Second)'s test of "the most
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. ""' Applying
this test in defamation cases means applying the law of the jurisdiction
with the strongest meaningful link to the publication and to the
parties." '4 In Shaha, it was quite appropriate to regard the Jordanian
law as the proper law of the tort. Both parties were citizens of
109. According to section 58 of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance (New Version) 2
Laws of the State of Israel 19 (English text prepared at the Ministry of Justice),
"Injurious Falsehood: (a) Injurious falsehood consists of the publication maliciously
by any person of a false statement, whether oral or otherwise, concerning the trade,
occupation or profession on the goods or the title to property of any other person,
provided that no person shall recover compensation in respect of any such publication
unless he has suffered pecuniary damage thereby."
110. Jackson v. British Medical Ass'n, [1970] 1 All E.R. 1094, 1104.
111. Friedman, Injurious Falsehood - The Unused Option for the Commercial
Competitor's Protection Against False Advertising, 36 HAPRAKUr 425 (1985); Wolff,
Unfair Competition by Truthful Disparagement, 47 YALE L.J. 1304, 1309-12 (1938).
112. For recent developments in English conflict of laws, see Morse, Choice of
Law in Tort: A Comparative Survey, 32 AM. J. Comp,. L. 51 (1984); Fawcett, Policy
Considerations in Tort Choice of Law, 47 MOD. L. REv. 650 (1984); Pryles, The
Law Applicable to Interstate Torts: Farewell to Phillips v. Eyre, 63 AusT. L.J. 158
(1989); Note, The Tort In The Conflict of Laws, 105 LAW Q. Rv. 359 (1989).
113. See Ben-Porath, D.P., in Klausner v. Berkowitz and Another, P.D. 37(4)
(1983) 449, 457; c.a. 300/84, Abu Atiyah and Others v. Arabtisi and Others, P.D.
39(1) 365, 381-2 (1985); c.p. (Jer.) 1329/84, Kupath Holim v. Neve Midbar Sharem-
El Shech Inc., P.M 5745(2) (1985) 412; c.p. (T.A.) 2911/83, Katz v. Egged, P.M.
5747(2) 119 (1987).
114. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 150(2) (1970); Prosser,
Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REv. 959, 971 (1953); Handford, Defamation
and the Conflict of Laws in Australia, 32 INT. & Comp. L. Q. 452, 461 (1983).
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Jordan, the statements were made in Jordan and at least part of the
damage was inflicted in Jordan. Undoubtedly, from a Jordanian
perspective, the statements in question were defamatory.
The Israeli courts should have explored the availability of other
causes of action. The plaintiff could not avail himself of the debatable'15
tort of placing another before the public in a false light.116 This tort,
which embraces the case of attributing to an individual political or
other views which he does not in fact hold, is not recognized under
the Israeli law of torts. In any case, such an action would not have
enabled the Shaha court to side-step the problem of evaluating the
nature of the statements in question. Although this cause of action
need not be defamation, it must still be something that would be
objectionable to the ordinary reasonable man under the circum-
stances. 117
Another alternative avenue totally avoids the question of the de-
famatory nature of the statements. Defamation is not the only species
of injuria verbis. Various legal systems recognize a rule according to
which a non-defamatory statement may amount to a good foundation
for an action for damages if the plaintiff could show (1) that the
statement made by the defendant was false; (2) that it was made
with a design to injure; and (3) that it did in fact injure."' In Israeli
115. Many false light cases could be brought as "libel per quod" actions. Some
scholars regard this action as superfluous. See Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law - Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 327, 331-37 (1966).
116. See Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Goldberg v. Ideal Pub. Corp.,
210 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sup. Ct. 1960). In England, see Lord Byron v. Johnston, 35
Eng. Rep. 851 (1816).
117. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALiF. L. REv. 383, 400 (1960).
118. See, Lamond v. Daily Record, 1923 S.L.T. 512, 515-16; Steel v. Scottish
Daily Record and Sunday Mail Ltd., 1970 S.L.T. 53 (1969). Compare with Acrow
(Automation) Ltd. v. Rex Chainbelt Inc., [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1676, 1682; Morrison
v. N.B.C., 266 N.Y.S.2d 406, 415: in New York Beaudesert Shire Council v. Smith,
120 C.L.R. 145, 156 (1966) (Australia). A similar theory is the prima facie tort
theory (if the defendant causes damage to the plaintiff intentionally and without
justification he should be liable). See, e.g., Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119
N.W. 946 (1909), 119 N.W. 946 (1909); Catalano v. Capital Cities Broadcasting
Corp., 63 Misc.2d 595, 313 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1970), 313 N.Y.S. 2d 52 (1970). Compare
with Mogul Steamship Co. Ltd. v. McGrgor, Gow & Co. Ltd., 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613
(1889). See also Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W. 2d 251, 271 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982); Drechsel, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress - New Tort Problem for
the Mass Media, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 889 (1985); Linden, When Names Are Not
News, They're Negligence: Media Liability for Personal Injuries Resulting from the
Publication of Accurate Information, 52 U. Mo. K.C. L. REv. 421 (1984); Note,
Tort Liability for Nonlibelous Negligent Statements: First Amendments Consider-
ations, 93 YALE L.J. 744 (1984); Mead, Suing Media For Emotional Distress: A
Multi-Method Analysis of Tort Law Evolution, 23 WAsHBURN L. J. 24 (1983).
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law, a similar rule prevailed for a while, but the courts eventually
decided not to follow it."19
Another possible cause of action is the intentional or negligent
infliction of emotional distress.' 20 Under Israeli law, these causes of
action now fall within the ambit of the tort of negligence.' 2' If there
were no foundation for the allegation that the plaintiff collaborated
with the Israeli authorities, it was negligent on the part of the de-
fendant to ascribe to the plaintiff such behavior, thereby inflicting
upon him pecuniary damage and substantial loss of esteem. It is
submitted that the existence of this cause of action was another good
reason not to strike down the action in Shaha.
Moreover, defendant's behavior in Shaha was not merely negligent.
It was also, to say the least, irresponsible. Given the ongoing violent
struggle between Jews and Arabs in Judea, Samaria, and East Je-
rusalem, the publication of statements accusing members of the local
community of collaboration with the Israeli authorities is almost an
invitation to murder. The long list of people murdered before and
particularly after Shaha underscores that danger. It is therefore most
unfortunate that the Israeli Supreme Court ignored this fateful, re-
alistic aspect of Shaha.
119. c.a. 140/53, Adama v. Levi, P.D. 9, 1666 (1956).
120. c.a. 416/58, Jadeon v. Suliman, P.D. 13, 916 (1960).
121. See c.a. 243/83, Municipality of Jerusalem v. Gordon, P.D. 39 (1) 113 (1985).
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